The Origin of the Claim Test: A Search for Objectivity by Schnee, Edward J. & Stara, Nancy J.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Tax Journal Akron Law Journals
1997
The Origin of the Claim Test: A Search for
Objectivity
Edward J. Schnee
Nancy J. Stara
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal
Part of the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Tax Journal by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schnee, Edward J. and Stara, Nancy J. (1997) "The Origin of the Claim Test: A Search for Objectivity," Akron Tax
Journal: Vol. 13 , Article 4.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol13/iss1/4
THE ORIGIN OF THE CLAIM TEST.
A SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY
by
EDWARD J. SCHNEE*
NANCY J. STARA**
INTRODUCTION
The tax benefit received from a taxpayer's expenditures, particularly in
the context of expenditures associated with litigation,' depends on their charac-
terization as either currently deductible, nondeductible or capitalizable. This
characterization, in turn, depends on the answers to two questions. First, did the
expenditures arise in connection with the taxpayers' business or income produc-
ing activities rather than their personal activities? Second, did the expenditures
arise in connection with the acquisition or disposition of capital assets? To deter-
mine whether these connections are made the origin of the claim test is applied;
i.e., the nature of the initial claim or transaction characterizes all expenditures
incurred with respect to it.2
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Kroy
(Europe) Ltd., used the origin of the claim test to determine the deductibility of
financing expenses? At approximately the same time, the Tax Court, in Fort
Howard Corp. v. Commissioner, concluded the use of the origin of the claim test
to characterize similar expenditures was inappropriate.4 Given this conflict and
the extensive use of this test to evaluate the deductibility of expenditures, this
article reviews the development of this test and provides an analysis of the poten-
tial conflicts and uncertainties in its application.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORIGIN OF THE CLAIM TEST
The origin of the claim test was first applied by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Gilmore to determine if a husband's litigation costs in his divorce
proceedings were either currently deductible business expenses or nondeductible
* Joe Lane Professor of Accounting, Culverhouse School of Accountancy, University of
Alabama; C.P.A.
** Associate Professor and Nebraska CPAs Distinguished Professor, School of Accountancy,
College of Business Administration, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; C.P.A.
*** All citations are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and to the regulations thereunder,
as amended to the date of publication, unless otherwise noted.
1. Fort Howard Corp. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 345, 359 n.26 (1994).
2. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
3. 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,316 (9th Cir. 1994).
4. 103 T.C. 345 (1994).
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personal expenses.' The Supreme Court established that characterization of liti-
gation costs as business or personal depended on "whether or not the claim aris-
es in connection with the taxpayer's profit-seeking activities" rather than on "the
consequences that might result to a taxpayer's income-producing property from a
failure to defeat the claim."6  By rejecting a test based on consequences, the
Supreme Court chose not to consider the taxpayer's business motives or purpos-
es in undertaking the litigation. 7 It refused to consider that if the taxpayer failed
to defeat the sensational and reputation damaging charges of the claim, his busi-
ness franchise which was his principal means of livelihood might be canceled!
Rather, the Supreme Court chose to apply the origin of the claim test because "if
the relative impact of a claim on the income-producing resources of a taxpayer
were to determine deductibility, substantial 'uncertainty and inequity would
inhere in the rule."' 9 By applying the origin of the claim test in United States v.
Gilmore, the Supreme Court found that the origin and character of the litigation
costs were personal because they arose in connection with a divorce proceeding
which is a product of personal or family life and not a business activity. 0
Initially, the origin of the claim test was limited to characterizing expens-
es as either deductible business expenses or nondeductible personal expenses. A
primary purpose test was used to characterize capital expenditures." But, in the
companion cases of Woodward v. Commissioner'2 and United States v. Hilton
Hotels Corp.,'3 the Supreme Court chose to displace the primary purpose test and
to extend the origin of the claim test to characterize litigation costs as either cur-
rently deductible or capitalizable.
Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") Section 263 provides that certain
expenditures related to property must be capitalized. Treasury Regulation
1.263(a)-2(c) contains a list of examples of these expenditures and includes the
"cost of defending or perfecting title to property." Recognizing that, in one sense,
any lawsuit brought against taxpayers may affect their title to property, the courts
had developed the primary purpose test to characterize litigation costs.'" If the
5. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 39 (1963).
6. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 50.
9. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 51.
10. Id. at 52 n.22. The Supreme Court noted that the "attempted analogy of a marital 'part-
ner ship' to the business partnership ... is of course unavailing. -The marriage relationship can
hardly be deemed an income-producing activity." Id.; See also United States v. Patrick, 372
U.S. 53, 57 (1963).
11. Moore Trust v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 430, 437-38 (1968), acq. 1968-2 C.B. 2.
12. 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
13. 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
14. Hochschild v. Commissioner, 47-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9265 (2nd Cir. 1947).
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primary purpose of litigation was to defend or perfect the title to property, its cost
was capitalized."5 But, Tax Court Judge Tannenwald, in a 1968 concurring opin-
ion, questioned the use of the primary purpose test when he wrote:
I think the use of a "primary purpose" test in cases of this type is
inappropriate, because it implies that the subjective intent of the
parties ought to be taken into account. I believe that, in the area of
litigation expenses, it is "the origin and character of the claim
with respect to which [the] expense was incurred" which controls.
See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963). The ratio-
nale which underpins this mandate of the Supreme Court is equal-
ly applicable in determining whether an expenditure is a nonde-
ductible capital item or a deductible expense within the purview of
section 212 and in determining whether the expenditure is a non-
deductible personal item or a section 212 deduction.
16
In 1970, the Supreme Court, in Woodward v. Commissioner, concurred
with Judge Tannenwald noting that "[t]his [primary purpose] test hardly draws a
bright line and has produced a melange of decisions, which, as the Tax Court has
noted, 'it would be idle to suggest ... [it] can be reconciled.""' 7 Rather than
attempting to reconcile these decisions, the Supreme Court extended the origin of
the claim test from United States v. Gilmore to characterize litigation costs as
either deductible or capitalizable for tax purposes.'8
In the cases of Woodward v. Commissioner" and United States v. Hilton
Hotels Corp.,20 the litigation costs were incurred to determine a value for stock
which state statutes required the taxpayer-corporation to purchase from minority
shareholders who were objecting to certain actions of corporate management. The
Supreme Court did not view this appraisal litigation as either defending or per-
fecting title to the corporate assets even though the minority stockholders were
hostile to the interests of the corporation. Rather, it raised the "simpler inquiry
[of] whether the origin of the claim litigated is in the process of the acquisition
15. Iowa S.Utils. Co. v. Commissioner, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9580, at 93, 357 (8th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 946 (1964); Industrial Aggregate Co. v. United States, 60-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) % 9806 (8th Cir. 1960); Lewis v Commissioner, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9420 (2nd Cir. 1958); Rassenfoss v. Commissioner, 47-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9108
(7th Cir. 1946); Moore Trust v. Commissoner, 49 T.C. 430 (1968), acq. 1968-2 C.B. 2.
16. Moore Trust v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 430, 443 (1968), acq. 1968-2 C.B. 2.
17. Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 576 (1970).
18. Woodward, 397 U.S. at 578-79.
19. 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
20. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
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itself.L 2' In so doing, the Supreme Court did not fully reject the primary purpose
test in cases to defend or protect title; instead, it found the test was inappropriate
for characterization of acquisition costs.' Subsequently, however, the courts have
applied the origin of the claim test to characterize expenditures to defend or per-
fect title.23
In United States v. Gilmore, the origin of the claim was divorce litigation
which was the product of the taxpayer's personal life. 4 Having determined this,
the tax characterization of the litigation costs as nondeductible expenses followed
naturally. In Woodward v. Commissioner2 and in United States v. Hilton Hotel
Corp.,' the origin of the transaction was the acquisition of stock. Since business
expenditures for the acquisition of assets are capitalized, the costs were charac-
terized as an adjustment to the capital asset.2 The ease of applying this test, how-
ever, evaporates when confronted with more complicated factual questions and,
in addition, using the origin of the claim test to characterize all expenditures may
not always be appropriate.28 These problems become more evident upon a review
of cases which have applied the origin of the claim test.
APPLYING THE ORIGIN OF THE CLAIM TEST
In Keller St. Development Co. v. Commissioner,29 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals described the characterization of an expenditure using the origin of the
claim test as a two-step process.3 In the initial step, the origin of the claim from
which the tax dispute arose is discovered. In the second step, the expenditure is
attributed to its origin to determine its actual tax characterization. "[Tihe cost (or
income) at issue must be attributed to a business activity to be a business expense,
a personal activity to be a personal expense, or a capital activity to be an adjust-
ment in the value of the capital asset."3' The application of the origin of the claim
21. Woodward, 397 U.S. at 577; see also Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. at 583.
22. 397 U.S. at 577.
23. See Nickell v. Commissioner, 87-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9585 (6th Cir. 1987); see also
Anchor Coupling Co., Inc. v. United States, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) [ 9341 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 908 (1970); Arthur H. DuGrenier, Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 931
(1972); Reed v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 32 (1970); Heath v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH)
698 (1983).
24. 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
25. 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
26. Hilton Hotel Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
27. See id. at 583; see also Woodward, 397 U.S. at 575.
28. Fort Howard Corp. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 345, 359 (1994).
29. 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9601 (9th Cir. 1982).
30. Keller St. Dev. Co. at 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9601, at 85,186.
31. Id.
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test using these steps, necessitates that the originating activity first be identified
and, then, defined.
Identifying the originating activity may not be easy. Since its formation,
the origin of the claim test has been applied to relate expenses to remote origins.
For example, litigation costs have been related to litigation that was concluded32
and to litigation that was only threatened.33 As expenses become less directly
associated with litigation, attributing the character of the litigation to the expens-
es becomes even more problematic.
Once the originating activity is identified, it must then be defined. While
recognizing that primary purpose is irrelevant in applying the origin of the claim
test,3M it remains a relevant inquiry in defining either a trade or business,35 an
expense incurred in carrying on that trade or business3 or the true character of a
transaction which may be disguised.' Because "carrying on" a trade or business
requires that a particular expense be "directly connected with or pertaining to the
taxpayer's trade or business, ''38 a proximate relationship between the expense and
the taxpayer's trade or business must exist.39 In determining if this relationship
exists, intent is one factor to be considered.' Similarly, if no substantial business
connection is found for payments which personally benefit a shareholder-employ-
ee, the payments may be challenged as disguised dividends.4' It is this intertwin-
ing of the business defining issues with the origin of the claim test that adds to the
complexity of applying the origin of the claim test.
CHARACTERIZATION: PERSONAL OR PROFIT-SEEKING
When first applied, the origin of the claim test was used to distinguish
nondeductible personal expenses from deductible profit-seeking expenses. 42 To do
32. United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53, 55-56, (1963).
33. Eisler v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 634, 637 (1973).
34. Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 577-78 (1970).
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2 (1996); Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987).
36. Patterson v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 640, 642 (1968), rev'd 436 F.2d 359 (9th
Cir. 1971); I.R.C. § 162(a) (1996); Tres. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1996).
37. See Yelencsics v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1513, 1531 (1980), acq. 1981-2 C.B. 2; See
also Smith v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1246 (1979); B. BrITKER AND J. EUSTIcE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, Para. 5.03(1) at 5-11 to 5-
12 (6th ed.).
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1996).
39. See Patterson, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 640, 642, rev'd, 436 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1971); 267-3d
Tax Mgmt. (BNA), Educational and Professional Expenses - Section 162, A-3-A-4.
40. See Baker v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 243 (1968) (taxpayer was merely fulfilling his gen-
eral education aspirations).
41. See Smith, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1246 (1979).
42. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; I.R.C. §§ 162, 212, 262.
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so, however, without considering either the consequences of the litigation or the
primary purpose of the activity, necessitated that the form of the originating
activity take on increased significance. 3 If the form of the originating
activity was inherently personal, such as a divorce or will contest, the courts char-
acterized the expenses associated with the activity as personal.'M Yet, if the orig-
inating activity was litigation which had no inherently personal character, such as
a bankruptcy, the courts allowed expenses to be characterized as part personal and
part profit-seeking. Because the form of the originating activity may be determi-
native of its character, careful consideration should be given to the form that liti-
gation takes. The following discussion of cases illustrates the importance of form
in characterizing expenditures.
Divorce Litigation
Since the Supreme Court first applied the origin of the claim test to char-
acterize costs incurred in a divorce proceeding as nondeductible personal expens-
es,45 it is reasonable to assume that the test will be applied to characterize costs
whenever their origin is a divorce proceeding. Therefore, it is not surprising that,
recently, the Tax Court denied the expense incurred to value a partnership inter-
est when the origin of the expense was a division of marital property in a
divorce.'
In Melat v. Commissioner,7 the taxpayer attempted to distinguish United
States v. Gilmore48 by arguing that seventy-five percent of the legal and account-
ing expenses were currently deductible under I.R.C. Section 212(2) because they
were incurred to protect "the future stream of income" from his partnership inter-
est. Although the Tax Court acknowledged that one result of the divorce may be
the reduction of the taxpayer's income producing assets, the origin of the claim
was the divorce which is a personal activity, making the legal fees not
deductible.49
43. Dibsy v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 918 (1955) (intent in a like-kind exchange is
irrelevant and form will prevail over substance when it is difficult to distinguish a sale from an
exchange on any ground other than form).
44. See, e.g. Callander v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 334 (1980). The denial of inherently per-
sonal expenses has been without applying the origin of the claim test. Id. at 336. For exam-
ple, the cost of maintaining checking account which was used to pay personal bills not
deductible even though it also served as a record of financial transactions. Id. Rev. Rul. 82-
168, 1982-2 C.B. 56 (cost of wristwatch required by employer not deductible).
45. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
46. See Melat v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2868 (1993).
47. Melat, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2868 (1993).
48. 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
49. Id. at 43-44.
[VOL. 13
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Despite the apparent ease with which the test can be applied to charac-
terize litigation expenses incurred in a divorce, the actual application of the test
has interesting limitations. One of these is reflected by the Tax Court's holding
in Wild v. Commissioner." Ruth Wild allocated $6,000 out of the $10,000 of
legal fees she incurred during her divorce as the cost of obtaining taxable alimo-
ny and deducted that amount under I.R.C. Section 212(1) as an expense for the
production of income' The Internal Revenue Service ("Service"), relying on
United States v. Gilmore, denied its deduction under the origin of the claim test as
a nondeductible personal expense 2 The majority of the Tax Court in a reviewed
decision held the expense to be deductible because Treasury Regulation 1.262-
1 (b)(7) applied:
Generally, attorney's fees and other costs paid in connection with a
divorce, separation, or decree for support are not deductible by either
the husband or the wife. However, the part of an attorney's fee and the
part of the other costs paid in connection with a divorce ...which are
properly attributable to the production or collection of amounts
includible in gross income under section 71 are deductible by the wife
under section 212 3
The Tax Court refused to apply the origin of the claim test because the Service
had not modified this regulation to reflect United States v. Gilmore.' It distin-
guished this Supreme Court case because it had dealt with another subsection of
the Internal Revenue Code and had concerned a husband rather than a wife.5 The
Tax Court has continued to follow the position it adopted in Wild v.
Commissioner.56 But, it has interpreted its position narrowly, restricting its appli-
cation to permit deduction of "legal expenses paid by the wife to obtain alimony
payments which were included in her gross income. '5
7
50. 42 T.C. 706 (1964), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 4.
51. Id. at 707.
52. Id. at 708.
53. Id. at 709-10.
54. 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
55. Wild, 42 T.C. at 710 n.6 (1964). The court found it significant that the Supreme Court in
United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963) referred to "the first sentence in reg. § 1.262-
l(b)(7) but not the second which provides the exception for the deduction of a portion of the
legal and other fees incurred by a wife." The Tax Court stated: "This is an unmistakable indi-
cation that the Supreme Court in that case was not considering the problem of the deductibility
of expenses paid or incurred by the wife in securing the payment to her of alimony which would
be includible in her gross income under § 71." Id.
56. 42 T.C. at 706; see Sunderland v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 512 (1977); see also
Wolfson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 290 (1966).
57. Sunderland, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 514 (1977).
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A second limitation on the actual application of the origin of the claim test
in a divorce proceeding is found in Dolese v. Commissioner in which the corpo-
rations owned by the husband-shareholder were named as defendants.58 The
Tenth Circuit used the origin of the claim test to permit the deduction by the cor-
porations of their twenty-five percent share of the legal and other expenses of lit-
igation and to deny a similar deduction by the husband-shareholder. 9 The court
was able to reach this decision by bifurcating the litigation, applying the origin of
the claim test separately to each part of the litigation. 6
In Dolese v. Commissioner the wife could not receive a property settle-
ment or divorce from the corporations, so the litigation was divided into the
divorce action directed against the husband and a mismanagement action direct-
ed against the corporations. 61 The court found two facts to be significant:
(1) the corporations were involuntary parties to the litigation; and
(2) the litigation restrained the corporations from undertaking certain
actions without permission of the court and attempted to remove the
husband-stockholder for mismanagement.62
The Tenth Circuit held that the legal expenses paid by the corporations to defend
against these actions were deductible.63 The litigation inhibited their conduct of
profit making activities and seemed to originate from their business activities. In
other words, the origin of the claim was the corporation's business. Having decid-
ed this, the court looked to the corporation's purpose in incurring the expenses to
determine if they were related to its business and, therefore, deductible. ' On the
other hand, expenses paid by corporations for appraisals of their assets were
nondeductible expenses be.cause these expenses had their origin in the divorce lit-
igation and were done to provide a valuation of the marital property.
This decision is unique because it is one of the first providing for dual ori-
gins of the claim. By doing so, it added further complexity to what was supposed
to be a simple cause and effect analysis of expenditures.
58. 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9540 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
59. Id. at 87,956-57.
60. Id. at 87,957-60.
61. Id. at 87,955-56.
62. Id. at 87,957-58.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 87,959.
[VOL. 13
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Inheritance
Although the Tax Court initially applied the primary purpose test in
McDonald v. Commissioner, on appeal the Second Circuit extended the origin of
the claim test to characterize the payments made to settle a will contest.6 The
case involved William McDonald, Sr., an attorney and friend of Hazel Leckie,
who was named as one of the residual beneficiaries under her will.6 While Mr.
McDonald had not drafted the will, he had drafted a codicil which had removed
a specific bequest and increased the amount passing to the residual beneficiaries.67
Upon her death, Ms. Leckie's relatives filed objections to the admission of the
will into probate alleging that Mr. McDonald had obtained his bequest by using
undue influence.6 The objections were withdrawn based on a compromise agree-
ment wherein Mr. McDonald agreed to pay $121,400 to the relatives.6 9 One of the
recitals in this agreement stated that:
... [T]he compromise had been reached in part because "it appears
that the litigation of the issues would engender much publicity and
would endanger the reputation of William J. McDonald as an
"770attorney...
The Tax Court applied the primary purpose test and permitted Mr.
McDonald to deduct the payment in compromise. While the Service contended
that Mr. McDonald's actions were motivated by his desire to preserve some por-
tion of his inheritance, the Tax Court stated that the only evidence before it sup-
ported Mr. McDonald's assertion that his actions were to protect his business rep-
utation and future earnings.7' The effect on Mr. McDonald's business reputation
was the same regardless of whether the litigation took the form of a will contest
or a malpractice claim for undue influence?
Based on the reported decision of the Tax Court, the origin of the claim
test was neither considered by the Tax Court nor argued by the Service. On
appeal, however, the Second Circuit first determined that the test had been applied
in a manner sufficiently broad to warrant its application and then applied it. Its
application was based on "whether the claim arose in connection with
65. 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9631 (2nd Cir. 1978) rev'g and rem'g, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 852
(1977).
66. Id. at 85,072.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 85,073.
69. Id. at 85,073.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. McDonald, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9631, at 85,073.
1997]
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McDonald's friendship for Mrs. Leckie or his 'profit-seeking activities' as her
attorney."73 The Court found that, regardless of Mr. McDonald's business moti-
vations for settling, the litigation costs were personal and nondeductible because
they arose in a nonbusiness context 4
This case illustrates one of the difficulties in applying the origin of the
claim test. The form the litigation takes may control the characterization of the
expense. Although the consequences of the litigation for Mr. McDonald were the
same regardless of whether the litigation was a will contest or a malpractice
claim, consequences are not to be considered in characterizing an expense. The
origin of the claim was a will contest; the nature of which is inherently personal.
The form of the litigation focused, not on his professional actions, but rather on
the personal advantage he may have gained under the will because of his use of
undue influence.
Bankruptcy
Unlike divorce and inheritance litigation, bankruptcy litigation does not
automatically determine the characterization of an expenditure under the origin of
the claim.' Bankruptcy litigation, in itself, is neither inherently personal nor prof-
it-seeking. As a result, form plays an important role in characterizing any associ-
ated litigation costs. For instance, in Dowd v. Commissioner, the Tax Court per-
mitted a taxpayer who was in bankruptcy to deduct as a business expense those
litigation costs directly attributable to negotiating an additional payment to be
made to business creditors. 76 But, in United States v. Collins, the Eleventh Circuit
denied a similar business deduction although business creditors benefitted from
the litigation settlement negotiated with the bankruptcy trustee.,n
The Tax Court permitted the business deduction in Dowd v.
Commissioner because the taxpayer-debtor negotiated the additional payments
with his business creditors so that they would not object to his discharge in bank-
ruptcy. The additional payment was made directly to the creditors and not to the
bankruptcy trustee. Because the taxpayer was on a cash basis, payment of the
business debts would normally have created a deductible expense. The bank-
ruptcy itself characterized neither the payments nor the associated litigation
73. McDonald, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9631, at 85,073.
74. Id.
75. See United States v. Collins, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,365, at 85,263 (1lth Cir.
1994).
76. 68 T.C. 294 (1977).
77. Collins, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,365, at 85,263.
[VOL. 13
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costs. 78 The form of the negotiation for the additional payment made the relation-
ship of these payments to the taxpayer's business apparent, and the litigation costs
attributable to these payments were easily determinable. Contrast the result in
Dowd v. Commissioner with United States v. Collins.79 In the latter case, a bank-
ruptcy trustee sought to set-aside Mr. Collins' discharge in bankruptcy based on a
fraudulent transfer of assets by him to a family trust in which he was neither a
trustee nor a beneficiary. 0 Mr. Collins, however, preempted the bankruptcy
trustee by filing an action in state court requesting a declaratory judgment hold-
ing that the bankruptcy trustee was not entitled to the assets of the family trust.8'
Subsequently, a settlement was reached, and Mr. Collins attempted to deduct the
amount paid in settlement and the litigation costs as a business expense because
these costs originated in an action by the bankruptcy trustee to recover additional
assets to pay business debts owned to the creditors in bankruptcy. 2 The Eleventh
Circuit found that the claim did not arise in connection with the taxpayer's prof-
it-seeking activities.83 Instead, it found that the litigation costs arose in a person-
al activity; i.e., the protection of family trust assets.
In making its decision, the Eleventh Circuit noted that Mr. Collins neither
negotiated with nor made any deal with the business creditors. 4 His payments
had no connection with business creditors and the objection to his discharge in
bankruptcy did not spring from his business activities." The settlement and liti-
gation costs, however, were paid to procure a dismissal of a suit against Mr.
Collins' family trust which, by its nature, was personal. Again, form was a deter-
minative factor in characterizing both the settlement and the associated litigation
costs as personal.
CHARACTERIZATION: CAPITAL OR PROFIT-SEEKING
The distinction is often close between ancillary costs related to capital
assets which are to be capitalized and other related costs which are current oper-
ating costs of a profit-seeking activity deductible under I.R.C. Sections 162 or
212.86 The origin of the claim test was devised to assist with making that distinc-
tion. Yet, it is difficult to apply because the definitions of capital activity and
78. Id. at 301.
79. 68 T.C. 294 (1977); 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,365 (11th Cir. 1994).
80. Collins, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,365, at 85,262-63.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 85,263-64.
84. Id. at 85,264.
85. Id.
86. See Honodel v. Commissioner, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19133, at 83,097 (9th Cir. 1984).
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business activity are not themselves clear.
Capitalization takes precedence over current expensing.87 Internal
Revenue Code Sections 63, 162 and 263 require that expenditures be capitalized
unless a specific deduction is allowed.' For an expenditure to be capitalized
under I.R.C. Section 263, it must either create or enhance an asset or, even if no
distinct asset is created or enhanced, it must produce significant benefits which
extend beyond the tax year. 9
Motivation in purchasing an asset is irrelevant.? Whereas, if a court is
asked to resolve whether an expenditure is a profit-seeking expense or personal
expense, it must consider primary purpose to determine whether a profit-seeking
activity exists from which the expense may have arisen and whether the expense
is directly connected with that trade or business.9' To avoid the complexity which
this determination adds, a court may choose to first consider the issue of whether
the expenditure is capital and to ignore, initially, whether the capital cost arose in
a personal activity or profit-seeking activity 2
Asset Dispositions
While, generally, litigation costs incurred to recover income derived from
a capital asset are deductible,93 the origin of the claim test is applied to deny the
deduction of litigation costs incurred to receive the sale proceeds themselves. 94 If
expenditures are incurred in the sale of an asset, regardless of whether they are
costs to enforce a contract or establish a selling price, they are not deductible. 95
Rather, these expenditures are to be used to offset realized capital gains.96 For
instance, legal fees and expenses were part of the sale transaction when incurred:
87. See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 17 (1974); see also Boagni v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708, 712 (1973), acq. 1973-2 C.B. 1.
88. I.R.C. §§ 63, 162, 263.
89. See Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S 79 (1992); see also Georator Corp. v. United
States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9685 (4th Cir. 1973) (noting that an expenditure does not
have to be described as a capital asset in § 1221 in order to be classified as a capital expendi-
ture); I.R.C. § 263; Treas. Reg.§§ 1.263(a)-i to -2.
90. See Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212, 223 (1988); see also Mitchell
v. Commissioner, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,042, at 83,158 (6th Cir. 1996).
91. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
92. See Mitchell, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,042, at 83,158 (6th Cir. 1996).
93. See Nickell v. Commissioner, 87-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9585 (1987); see also Boagni,
59 T.C. at 708 (1973), acq. 1973-2 C.B. 1.
94. See Helgerson v. United States, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9445 (8th Cir. 1970).
95. Id.
96. See Estate of Baier v. Commissioner, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9344, at 83,839 (3rd
Cir. 1976).
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THE ORIGIN OF THE CLAIM TEST
(1) to protect the value of security being held in escrow until all
installment sale proceeds were received;'
(2) to determine the amount to be received by an employee for
assigning a patent application over to his employer as required by his
employment contract.93
In both of these instances, the terms of the sale necessitated the legal fees.
In the first case, the purchasers had not received full ownership of the object of
the sale because of the escrow which the sale contract established. In the second
case, the sale price itself had not been agreed upon. In both situations, the court
focused on the capitalization issue avoiding the need to address the personal vs.
profit-seeking issue.
When the value of the asset received in liquidation cannot be determined
because of an unsettled lawsuit, the open transaction doctrine applies. 99 The result
is similar to the closing of a sale when the sale price itself has not been agreed
upon. For instance, the Fifth Circuit in Estate of Meade v. Commissioner applied
the origin of the claim test and found that the litigation costs were incurred, not to
collect income but, rather, to determine the value of the asset received in a liqui-
dation." The only reason the corporation itself was not litigating the lawsuit in
Meade was because of its liquidation. Having received the lawsuit in the liqui-
dation, the Fifth Circuit found that the shareholder was in no different position
than the corporation would have been.'' The proceeds of liquidation were not
determinable until the lawsuit was concluded. Again the capitalization issue was
the sole issue addressed.
Both the Tax Court and the Service have held, however, that acquisition
costs do not include payments under either covenants not to compete or long-
standing employment contracts." One example is Letter Ruling 9326001.111
97. See Helgerson, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) % 9445, at 83,582.
98. See Estate of Baier, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9344, at 83,839.
99. See Estate of Meade v. Commissioner, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9237 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 83, 441-44.
102. Taylor v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322 (1992) (origin of claim followed orig-
inal agreement which allocated payments between stock and covenant not to compete); Rev.
Rul. 73-146, 1973-1 C.B. 61, permitted a corporation to deduct payments to cancel existing
stock options as a result of a reorganization; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9527005 (March 15, 1995), per-
mitted a corporation to deduct a special bonus and other payments designed to make employ-
ees "whole" following a leveraged-buyout of the corporation; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9326001 (March
18, 1993). But see Rev. Rul. 73-580, 1973-2 C.B. 86, which requires payment for services
directly connected with a reorganization to be capitalized.
103. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 932600 (March 18, 1993).
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In Letter Ruling 9326001, Parent ("P") acquired Subsidiary ("S") as a
wholly owned subsidiary. Prior to the acquisition, S had employment contracts
with key employees that required a lump sum payment following certain events.
The acquisition of S was one of these events. Rather than paying under the con-
tract, P negotiated new employment contracts which included an installment pay-
ment which approximated the amount due under the prior contract and deducted
it for tax purposes when paid."° The ruling lists three facts to explain why the ori-
gin was the employment relationship and not the acquisition: tO
(1) the employees had been employed under several contracts that
contained the payment based on a triggering event;06
(2) the post-merger payment was in lieu of the amount due under the
pre-merger contract; 10 and
(3) the principal motivation for the payment was to assure the con-
tinued employment of the recipients10n
Initially, this third test may appear inconsistent with the application of the origin
of the claim test which rejected the "primary purpose test," but purpose or moti-
vation is relevant when determining whether an expense arose in connection with
carrying on a trade or business."n In other words, once the Service concluded that
the origin was the employment of the key personnel and not the acquisition, moti-
vation was considered in relation to the question of whether the expenditure met
the requirement of I.R.C Section 162.110 Was the payment a currently deductible
trade or business expense? The consideration of motivation is also illustrated in
the recent case of Mitchell v. Commissioner."'
In the case of Mitchell v. Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit was asked to
consider whether a restitution voluntarily paid to an employer by an employee in
104. Although P capitalized this payment for book purposes under the "push-down" method
of accounting required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Letter Ruling noted
that compulsory accounting rules of regulatory agencies do not control tax consequences.
105. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9326001, 3-6 (March 18, 1993).
106. Id. at 3-4.
107. Id. at 4-6.
108. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9326001, 6-7 (March 18, 1993).
109. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
110. Payment, in some objective sense, should be intended as compensation for services;
See e.g. X-L Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 701 (1973); Annabelle Candy
Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 873 (1961), rem'd on another issue, 314 F.2d
1 (9th Cir. 1962).
111. 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) 50,042 (6th Cir. 1996), aff'g, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3015 (1994).
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THE ORIGIN OF THE CLAIM TEST
order for the employee to keep stock which he had obtained in violation of feder-
al banking regulations was a expense incurred in carrying on a trade or business
or a capital expenditure. The employee argued that the violation of the federal
banking regulation was the origin of the claim, but the Sixth Circuit noted that
"this argument fails to address the fact that it was Mitchell's original intent to per-
sonally acquire the stock from the beginning of the transaction."' 2  Rather, the
Sixth Circuit determined that the origin of the restitution was Mitchell's personal
acquisition of the stock, it was paid to protect his ownership of that stock and it
must be treated as a capital expenditure."3
The use of intent by the Sixth Circuit to determine the true origin of the
claim is similar to the use of intent or primary purpose to determine the true char-
acter of a transaction which may be disguised."' The true origin of the claim was
not the employee's violation of the federal banking regulation because the
employee was required to make restitution only if he chose to keep the stock. If
he had voided the stock transfer, he would have paid no restitution."' The
employee's intent, as shown by the facts, was to acquire the stock.
Whether the disposition is voluntary or involuntary is not significant."
6
Involuntary dispositions include condemnations and, under the origin of the claim
test, legal fees arising from the condemnation are capitalized."7 Although the tax-
payer-landowner may incur legal fees to protest a condemnation and protect his
or her business, these legal fees are capitalized because the basis for the condem-
nation is the public need to acquire the taxpayer's land and that need exists
regardless of the taxpayer's business."' The taxpayer's motive or purpose in the
condemnation litigation is not to be considered;"19 except, it must be considered if
the true origin of the claim is disguised.
In a condemnation, efforts to currently deduct a prorata portion of the
legal fees incurred in connection with a condemnation by allocating these fees
between the condemnation award and the statutory prejudgment interest on that
112. Mitchell, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,042, at 83,158-59.
113. Id. at 83,159.
114. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
115. Mitchell, 96-1 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,042, at 83,157.
116. See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 579 n.8, (1970); see also Stokely-Van
Camp, Inc. v. United States, 92-2 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,459 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
117. See Madden v. Commissioner, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9415 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 912 (1975); see also Foster v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 190 (1986).
118. See Madden, at 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) 9415, at 87,068 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 912 (1975).
119. See Baylin v. United States, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) [ 50,029, at 83,114 (Ct.CI.
1993), aff'd, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,023 (Fed.Cir. 1995).
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award are not successful. "[T]he proper focus is not the proportional recovery of
each type of income, but the 'origin and character of the claim' with respect to
which the legal fees at issue were incurred."'20
Settlements
Depending on the origin of the claim, payments made to settle litigation
may be characterized as either a capital cost or a business expense.' If the liti-
gation being settled involved the purchase or sale of stock or property, settlement
payments are capitalized.22 Correspondingly, payments made to settle actions for
specific performance are capitalized because they are made to preserve title to the
property.'23 And, if an asset is preserved, these capitalized payments should be
allocated to the affected assets.'24 In the alternative, if title to an asset is not the
subject of the litigation, the settlement will be deductible if it can be associated
with daily business activities.'12 If a settlement which is not capitalized is paid by
a corporation, it, generally, will be associated with daily business activities of the
corporation because of the nature of the entity itself.'26
Threatened litigation and not merely lawsuits which have been filed must
be considered in determining the origin of the claim. In Eisler v. Commissioner,
the Tax Court determined that the origin of the settlement was not only the law-
120. Baylin v. United States, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,023, at 87,108 (Fed.Cir. 1995);
see Fulks v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 242 (1989).
121. See Anchor Coupling Co., Inc. v. United States, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9431 (7th
Cir. 1970); see also Eisler v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 634 (1973); Rev. Rul. 80-119, 1980-1 C.B.
40; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9427002 (March 30, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9442021 (July 20, 1994).
122. See, e.g. Fischer v. United States, 490 F.2d 218, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9161
(7th Cir. 1973); see also Clark Oil and Refining Corp. v. United States, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9214 (7th Cir. 1973); Barrett v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 713 (1991); Dogali v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1759 (1995).
123. See Anchor Coupling Co., Inc. at 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) 9431, at 83,535.
124. 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9431 at 83,536. The Seventh Circuit agreed with
the Service that the settlement should be viewed as a repurchase of its assets at a premium
which would then be included in the book value of Anchor's assets. Id. (An allocation similar
to that is used in § 1060.)
125. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9427002 (March 30, 1994), ruled that an anti-trust settlement was
deductible because it resulted from the daily operations of a railroad and, in the long-term, did
not eliminate competition; Priv. Ltr .Rul. 9442021 (July 20, 1994), ruled that the payment in
settlement of a class action suit concerning the adequacy of financial statement disclosures was
deductible.
126. See, e.g. Kopp's Co. Inc. v. United States, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9747 (4th Cir.
1980) (permitting a deduction of a settlement paid by a corporation as a result of an automo-
bile accident in which the car was driven by the child of the corporation's sole shareholder and
president); see also Naporano Iron and Metal Co. v. United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9867 (Ct.CI. 1984) (permitting the deduction of a settlement paid to a former employee who
was injured in a brawl with a company official).
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suits which had been filed but also the negligence suit that was threatened. 27
While the lawsuit began with a claim relating to stock purchased under an
Employmefft and Stock Purchase Agreement, the negligence claim was of prima-
ry importance to the litigants at the time the lawsuit settled. The character of the
controversy was modified during the course of the discovery proceeding although
the complaint was never amended to add a negligence count. In Revenue Ruling
80-119,128 the Service was even more specific. That ruling states: "Under the ori-
gin of the claim test it may be proper for a settlement payment to be allocated to
claims that were only threatened as well as those actually made."'2 9 Extending the
origin of the claim to include threatened litigation was of particular'importance in
Eiler v. Commissioner because the legal fees attributed to the negligence claim
were deductible business expenses; whereas, those allocated to the stock purchase
were capitalized costs."
Corporate Restructuring
The difficulty in determining the true origin of the claim is particularly
apparent in cases involving corporate restructuring; i.e., stock redemptions and
reorganizations. To the extent that a taxpayer can relate the expenditure to the
operations of the corporation, rather than the restructuring transaction, the more
likely the expenditure will be deductible and not capitalized.
Early Cases
One of the early cases which applied the origin of the claim test was
White Star Drive-In Laundry & Cleaners, Inc. v. United States.' A dissident
shareholder, who owned fifty percent of the corporation's stock, filed a lawsuit
seeking dissolution of the corporation. In settlement, the corporation redeemed
the dissident shareholder's stock and deducted the amount as a business
expense.32 Applying the origin of the claim test, the District Court found the ori-
gin of the expenditure was the stock redemption which is a non-deductible capi-
tal transaction."
Unlike the case of Eisler v. Commissioner," 4 the District Court in White
Star Drive-In Laundry & Cleaners, Inc. v. United States did not find a sec-
127. 59 T.C. 634 (1973).
128. 1980-1 C.B. 40 (1980).
129. Id.
130. Eisler v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 634 (1973).
131. 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9683 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
132. Id. at 85,686-87.
133. Id.
134. 59 T.C. 634 (1973).
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ond issue, either stated or threatened, that would support even a partial deduction.
Perhaps, if the dissident shareholder's dissatisfaction with the management of the
company could have been shown to have arisen from the negligent or fraudulent
actions of management, then at least a portion of the settlement may have been
deductible.'35
While White Star Drive-In Laundry & Cleaners, Inc. v. United States
considered the deduction of the legal fees incurred by the acquiring corporation,
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States'36 considered the deduction of legal
fees incurred by the shareholder. In this case, the Third Circuit determined that
origin of the legal fees incurred by Ledger, a shareholder who owned eighty-seven
percent of the stock of Republican, was to protect Ledger's investment from the
siphoning-off of Republican's earnings to a pension fund and certain individu-
als.'37 The Third Circuit distinguished its ruling from that of other cases because
neither the purchase price paid by Ledger for the Republican stock nor the value
of the Republican stock were in question:
...Although Ledger's litigation came soon after its acquisition of
Republican, the Government has failed to establish a nexus between the
litigation and the acquisition. The aforementioned cases all recite
price, time of payment, security for the sale, or method of treatment
of the proceeds of a sale as the connection that placed the litigation as
part and parcel of the acquisition or disposition process. No simi-
lar connection exists between Ledger's acquisition and its litigation.'38
Since neither the acquisition or disposition of stock occurred in Newark
Morning Ledger Co., the Third Circuit could more easily find that nexus was
missing and look at the nature of the stockholder's derivative suit as being one to
protect Republican, in which it owned stock, as well as to protect its investment
in Republican. 39 The Third Circuit noted that expenses of a derivative suit are
normally deductible by the corporation itself and, generally, the expenses of a
shareholder in a successful derivative suit are chargeable to the corporation
itself.' 0
135. White Star Drive-In Laundry & Cleaners, Inc. v. United States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) f 9683 (N.D. 11. 1972). The District Court in discussing its conclusion noted that the
alternative to the redemption settlement would have been a liquidation and that costs of a liq-
uidation would also have been capital in nature. Id. This statement, however, was in error.
Liquidation expenses, with the exception of expenses relating to sales of an asset are general-
ly deductible. Id.; Rev. Rul. 77-204, 1971-1 C.B. 40. This misinterpretation may have influ-
enced the decision of the District Court.
136. 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9523 (3rd Cir. 1976).
137. Id. at 84,657-58.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9523, at 84,657.
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Hostility
The potential consequences of a claim on the business operations of the
taxpayer are not to be considered under the origin of the claim test regardless of
how hostile the motivation. In Letter Ruling 9144042,'4' a corporation sought to
deduct amounts it would pay to redeem stock at a premium to prevent a hostile
takeover and to reimburse the corporate raider for its fees and cost related to the
failed takeover. The Service denied a deduction for either amount because the ori-
gin of the claim, a stock redemption, was a capital transaction." Motivation was
not relevant because whether the expense met the requirements of I.R.C. Section
162 was not at issue.
Recently, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, applied similar logic to
deny a deduction in Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. United States.'43 The corporation
tried to argue that the premium it paid to redeem its stock was deductible because
the redemption was to prevent a disruption in its business activities. The Court
rejected this argument considering motivation to be immaterial.'" The origin of
the claim was a stock redemption; i.e., a non-deductible capital transaction.
The corporation in Stokely-Van Camp relied on El Paso Company v.
United States 45 in attempting to deduct the premium it paid. In El Paso Co., the
Federal Circuit concluded that at least some of the expenses incurred in formu-
lating two divestiture plans were deductible because the plans, developed to com-
ply with a divestiture ordered by the Supreme Court, subsequently, were rejected
by the Supreme Court.'14 In distinguishing El Paso Co., the Federal Circuit in
Stokely-Van Camp stated:
...Unlike the divestiture in El Paso, SVC's decision to redeem its
stock was wholly voluntary, a decision it would not have made
unless it considered the decision to be in its own best interest. 47
Yet, by choosing to distinguish El Paso Co. on this basis, the court left
open the argument that some expenses incurred in a court ordered divestiture,
which are not held to benefit the corporation, will not be controlled by the origin
of the claim test and will be deductible as business expenses.
48
141. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9144042 (July 1, 1991).
142. Id.
143. 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50459 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
144. Id. at 85,572.
145. 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9711 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
146. Id. at 85,572-74.
147. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,459, at 85,572.
148. El Paso Co., at 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9711 (Fed. Cir. 1982). El Paso Co. v. United
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After Enaction of I.R. C Section 162(k)
In 1986, in response to the corporate take-overs of the 1980's, Congress
enacted I.R.C. Section 162(k). It provides that amounts paid or incurred in a stock
redemption are nondeductible. A corporation's right to deduct amounts paid to
redeem its stock was extremely doubtful before enactment of I.R.C. Section
162(k) due, at least in part, to the development and application of the origin of the
claim test.4 9
This disallowance provision makes an exception in I.R.C. Section
162(k)(2) for interest expense. In other words, if the origin of the transaction is a
stock redemption, the corporation is denied a deduction for all related expendi-
tures other than interest. 5  The application of the origin of the claim test after
the enactment of I.R.C. Section 162(k) has been considered in two recent cases;
i.e., United States v. Kroy (Europe) Ltd.' and Fort Howard Corp. v.
Commissioner.'2
In United States v. Kroy (Europe) Ltd., the taxpayer incurred expenses to
borrow money to redeem its own stock and take the company private in a lever-
aged buy out. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the taxpayer and found that two sep-
arate and independent transactions were involved; i.e., a stock redemption and a
borrowing transaction.' 53 It then applied the origin of the claim test and found the
expenses incurred to borrow the money were deductible.'- Although the funds
were used to redeem the stock, the borrowing was a separate transaction and,
under the origin of the claim test, the business purpose for borrowing the funds
was irrelevant.155
States, initially, stated the origin of the claim test was not applicable in a divestiture case when
authority existed which was directly on point. Id at 709. Further, it noted that Woodward v.
Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970), referred only to acquisitions and dispositions of capital
assets. Id. Thereby, taking a limited, rather than expansive, definition of the term. Id. at 711.
See also Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,459 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (dis-
cussing Woodward v. Commissioner and noting that the Supreme Court had rejected the argu-
ment that expenses incurred involuntarily should not be capitalized.) The court distinguished
El Paso Co., it chose to raise the voluntary, as opposed to the involuntary, nature of the
expense. Id. See also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 70-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) 9645 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding that a forced divestiture did benefit the
corporation so that expenses were not deductible).
149. B.BiTrKER AND J.EusTiCE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS, 5.04(6) n.131. (6th ed. 1994).
150. In 1996, I.R.C. Section 162(k)(2) was amended to exempt expenditures to obtain a loan
which are amortizable from nondeductibility. For further explanation of these expenditures see
infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
151. 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,316 (9th Cir. 1994).
152. 103 T.C. 345 (1994).
153. Kroy (Europe) Ltd., 94-2 Tax Cas. (CCII) 50,316, at 85,071-72.
154. Id.
155. Section 163(d) and (h), as amended in 1986, made the purpose of a borrowing transac-
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The Tax Court, however, in Fort Howard Corp. v. Commissioner criti-
cized the decision of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Kroy (Europe) Ltd.5 6 It
disagreed with the assumption made by the Ninth Circuit that the inquiry as to the
characterization of financing costs is the same as that contemplated by the origin
of the claim test.57 It noted that the origin of the claim test arose out of a need to
determine whether the expenses in defending a lawsuit were business or person-
al, current or capital. 5 In this case, however, characterization was not the issue.
All parties agreed that the financing costs were capital. 59 Rather, the issue was the
effect of I.R.C. Section 162(k) on a capitalizable expenditure. It stated that "[t]he
origin of the claim test provides no answer to this question."'1'
The Tax Court, however, did go on to discuss the origin of the claim test:
If we were to apply the origin test here, we could also be forced to look
further to the origin of the financing transaction. When we do so, we
find that the loan transaction had its origin in the redemption plan. The
financing originated in the planning stages of the redemption and
nowhere else. At this point, however, the origin of the claim test breaks
down. For the redemption was also a consequence of the financing.
Thus, the origin test does not help to resolve this case. Nor should we
expect it to. It was designed to make substantive distinctions between
business and personal expenditures, or between current and capital
expenditures. There are no such distinctions to be made here. 6'
This discussion is consistent with McKay v. Commissioner," a case decided ear-
lier in 1994, in which the Tax Court was offered the opportunity to characterize
costs incurred by the taxpayer-employee to finance litigation related to a wrong-
ful discharge action. The Tax Court did not use the origin of the claim test. 63
tion relevant by limiting interest deductions for taxpayers, except corporations, if the interest
is either investment interest or personal interest. Id. A corporation, however, is not required to
determine the purpose of its interest payments in order to obtain a deduction. I.R.C. § 163(d)
and (n) (1996).
156. 103 T.C. 345 at 353 (1994).
157. Id. at 359.
158. Id. at 360-61.
159. Kroy (Europe) Ltd., 94-2 U.S. Tax Case. (CCH) 50,316, at 85,071 (9th Cir. 1994).
While it is true that financing costs were capitalized prior to the enactment of § 162(k), they
were amortizable. Fort Howard Corp., 103 T.C. at 345. In applying § 162(2) the court deter-
mined that the financing costs were incurred "in connection with the redemption of its stock"
and denied any deduction of these costs. Id. See also Rev. Rul. 70-360, 1970-2 C.B. 103; Rev.
Rul. 70-359, 1970-2 C.B. 103.
160. 103 T.C. at 359.
161. 103 T.C. at 360.
162. 102 T.C. 465 (1994).
163. Id. at 488-90.
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Instead, it stated that the interest expense was related to the taxpayer's business
of being an employee and, therefore, the deduction was denied by I.R.C. Section
163(h)(2)(A).' 6 In McKay v. Commissioner and, again, in Fort Howard Corp. v.
Commissioner, the Tax Court treated financing as one part of a larger transaction
(i.e., business employment in the former and redemption in the latter) and deter-
mined the tax character based on this larger transaction.'6
It is interesting to note, however, that the Tax Court in McKay v.
Commissioner applied the origin of the claim test to characterize other litigation
costs incurred by the taxpayer.' Specifically, the Tax Court allowed the taxpay-
er a deduction for costs to defend himself against a shareholder derivative suit.'67
Relying on Gilmore v. United States6 and McKeague v. United States, 69 it con-
cluded that litigation costs are to be segregated based on the various individual
claims and evaluated individually using the origin of the claim test."7°
FURTHER EXTENSIONS OF THE TEST: LOSSES
Losses may result when either debts become worthless7 or judgments are
paid as a result of attempting to sell invalid property rights.'7 If the loss, howev-
er, is to be deductible ordinary loss, it must not arise from a capital transaction. If
it does, it will be a capital loss for which deductions are limited. The application
of the origin of the claim test to losses, however, represents a further extension of
this test.
Guarantees
In First National Bank of Duncanville v. United States,' the Tax Court
used the origin of the claim test to characterize as a deductible bad debt the Bank's
payment of a one-hundred percent payroll tax penalty assessed against it under
I.R.C. Section 6672 as a responsible officer. A security agreement gave the Bank
164. Id. at 495.
165. McKay v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 465 (1994); Fort Howard Corp. v. Commissioner,
103 T.C. 345 (1994).
166. McKay, 102 T.C. at 494.
167. Id. at 488-89.
168. 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963).
169. 12 CI.Ct. 671 (1987), aff'd without published opinion, 852 F.2d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
170. 102 T.C. at 490.
171. See First National Bank of Duncanville v. United States, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9561 (D.C. No. Dist. Tx. 1979).
172. See Boothe v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 804 (1984), rev'd per curiam and rem'd, 768 F.2d
1140, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9615 (9th Cir. 1985).
173. 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9561 (N.D. 1979).
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a contractual right of contribution from the debtor.74 But for the debtor-creditor
relationship which existed, and the Bank's desire to protect and maintain the col-
lateral, it would not have become directly involved in the debtor's financial affairs
and would not have had a I.R.C. Section 6672 penalty assessed against it. 75
Because of the insolvency of the debtor, the Bank could not collect repayment
from the debtor under the right to contribution, the debt arising from the I.R.C.
Section 6672 penalty became worthless, and the Bank deducted the payment
under I.R.C. Section 166.171 The right to contribution or indemnity converted an
otherwise non-deductible penalty into a deductible bad debt.'n
While a loss is permitted on the payment in release of a guarantee, the
guarantee must be a true guarantee. 7 For instance, in Kisska v. Commissioner, 179a
debtor argued that a separate payment made by the debtor to obtain a release from
a contingent liability, in the nature of a guarantee, was deductible as an ordinary
loss under I.R.C. Section 165(a). The Tax Court, however, applied the origin of
the claim test and found the debtors were not guarantors.180 Rather the debtors
had paid the separate payment to terminate their own obligation on a
promissory note which arose in a capital transaction.' The payment was treated
as a capital loss." Similarly, in Clay v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that
amounts paid by a seller under a covenant to indemnify a purchaser for any undis-
closed liabilities were entitled only to long-term capital loss treatment as the
covenant was part of the agreement for sale of certain stock. In neither of these
cases, was the taxpayer a true guarantor.'83 The original contract of the principal
and the guarantor were one in the same. The guarantee was not a collateral agree-
ment for the performance of another's undertaking.' 4
Theft Loss
In Boothe v. Commissioner, 11 a taxpayer claimed a theft loss under I.R.C.
Section 165 because the judgment he paid resulted from a breach of warranty
174. Id. at 88,042.
175. Id. at 88,043.
176. Id. at 88,044.
177. First National Bank of Duncanville, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9561, at 88,044.
178. See Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
179. Kisska v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1651 (1981).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Clay v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 456 (1981).
184. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 7096 (6th ed. 1990) (One to whom a guarantee is made.
This word is also used, as a noun, to denote the contract of guaranty or the obligation of a guar-
antor, and, as a verb, to denote the action of assuming the responsiblities of a guarantor).
185. 82 T.C. 804 (1984), rev'd per curiam and rem'd, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9615 (9th
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action. The rights which the taxpayer sold had previously been sold by his pre-
decessor and his subsequent sale was invalid.1 6 Although this case was ultimate-
ly reversed in a per curiam decision by the Ninth Circuit, it shows the difficulty
in determining the origin of the claim and, also, the disagreement within the Tax
Court as to its applicability.'
In a reviewed decision, the Tax Court applied the origin of the claim test
to hold that a sale of invalid property rights was the origin with the payment of
the judgment resulting in a capital loss."8 While ten judges joined in the majori-
ty opinion, eight judges, in their dissenting opinions, questioned the application
of the origin of the claim test."9 Judge Hamblen's dissenting opinion, in which
five judges joined, contended that the origin of the claim test should not be
extended to deductions claimed under I.R.C. Section 165:
Theft loss deductions, under section 165(c)(3), are allowed to indi-
viduals without regard to whether the losses arise in connection with
the taxpayer's profit-seeking activities. Accordingly, the rationale
for the origin-of-the-claim analysis, as expressed by the Supreme
Court in Gilmore and Patrick is irrelevant to the legal and factual set-
ting of the instant case. The majority has confused the origin-or-the-
claim test of Gilmore, Patrick, and their ilk with the"look-back" rule
of Arrowsmith v. Commissioner....
Similarly, theft loss deductions, under section 165(c)(3), are
allowed to individuals without regard to whether what was stolen was
a capital asset in the taxpayer's hands. The Congress might have
treated such losses as sales or exchanges, but it did not choose to do so.
Rather, the Congress chose to allow an ordinary deduction for a theft
loss, even if a sale of the stolen asset would have produced a capital
loss deduction (or no deduction at all, if the transaction had not been
entered into for profit). Accordingly, it is not relevant in the instant
case to analyze whether petitioner's expenditures are capital
expenditures.Y9
Judge Hamblin refused to apply the origin of the claim test because to do
so would subordinate legislative expression to a judicial interpretative concept. 9'
Cir. 1985).
186. Id. at 805.
187. 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9615 (9th Cir. 1985).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Boothe, 82 T.C. 813.
191. Id. at 806-08.
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His analysis is of particular interest because the Tax Court recently adopted a sim-
ilar analysis in Fort Howard Corp. v. Commissioner.92
Judge Komer's dissenting opinion, in which one judge concurred, sepa-
rated the events rather than telescoping them into a single transaction.' 93 As the
judgment required the taxpayer to repay the original sales price he had received
in the invalid sale, paying the judgment restored the taxpayer's original tax
basis.9 4 This original basis, Judge Korner treated as a theft loss under I.R.C.
Section 165(c)(3).' 95 The payment ordered by the judgment itself (increased by
the reported capital gain on the original sale transaction), he treated as a capital
loss under the origin of the claim test.' In a subsequent per curiam decision, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted Judge Korner's opinion after first noting
the sharp differences of opinion within the Tax Court and the unusual facts.' 9
The opinions in Fort Howard Corp. v. Commissioner and Boothe v.
Commissioner question the scope of the origin of the claim test.'98 Should it be
used beyond its original purpose which was to distinguish personal from business
expenditures and deductible from capitalizable costs. As Judge Hamblin pointed
out in his dissent in Boothe v. Commissioner extending the origin of the claim test
to cases involving I.R.C. Sections 165 and 162(k) would negate Congressional
intent to permit or deny a deduction.'92 Applying the origin of the claim test to
these cases would subject them to a general purpose test rather than to the specif-
ic test enacted by Congress.'
LIMITATIONS
The origin of the claim test is a judicial interpretative concept. As such,
its use may not always be appropriate. Statutory tests will take precedence. In
Fort Howard Corp. v. Commissioner, the Tax Court applied the specific test pro-
vided in I.R.C. Section 162(k). 0' It did not view its decision as a reversion to the
primary purpose test or as a rejection of the origin of the claim test.9 2 Yet, the
192. 103 T.C. 345 (1994); see supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
193. Boothe, 82 T.C. at 809-12.
194. Id. at 808.
195. Id. at 812.
196. Id.
197. Boothe, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9615.
198. 103 T.C. 345 (1994); 82T.C. 813 (1984), rev'dper curiam & rem'd, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9615 (9th Cir. 1985).
199. Boothe, 82 T.C. at 812.
200. Id. at 812-14.
201. 103 T.C. 345 (1994).
202. 103 T.C. at 361 (1994).
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Ninth Circuit, when confronting similar factual situations, has preferred to first
separate the events into two distinct transactions and, then to apply the specific
statutory test.203 It did so in Boothe v. Commissioner to permit the theft loss
deduction.204 It did so in United States v. Kroy (Europe) Ltd. to avoid the appli-
cation of I.R.C. Section 162(k)."°
The distinction between positions of the Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court
revolves around differing views of the facts. And, as Boothe points out, facts can
be viewed differently even by judges who sit on the same court. Because the ori-
gin of the claim test is a facts and circumstances test, it will remain a difficult test
to apply and, in those cases in which the courts view it as the appropriate test,
questions will continue to arise as to how to apply it.
Determining the Origin
In 1973, when the Tax Court applied the origin of the claim test to deter-
mine if legal fees were deductible in Boagni v. Commissioner,2' it stated:
Quite plainly, the "origin-of-the-claim" rule does not contemplate
a mechanical search for the first in the chain of events which led to
the litigation but, rather, requires an examination of all the facts.
The inquiry is directed to the ascertainment of the kind of transaction
out of which the litigation arose .... Consideration must be given to
the issues involved, the nature and objectives of the litigation, the
defenses asserted, the purpose for which the claimed deductions
were expended, the background of the litigation, and all facts pertain-
ing to the controversy....20
This approach to determining the origin has been cited favorably by the Tax Court
in subsequent decisions.0 8 However, it has not been as well received by the Ninth
Circuit.
In Keller Street Development Co. v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit crit-
icized the Tax Court statement of the origin of the claim test saying its consider-
ation of the objectives of the litigation and the purpose of the claimed deductions
203. Id. at 358-59.
204. 82 T.C. at 804 (1984), rev'd per curiam and rem'd, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) a 9615
(9th Cir. 1985).
205. 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,316 (9th Cir. 1994).
206. 59 T.C. 708 (1973), acq. 1973-2 C.B. 1.
207. Id. at 713.
208. See 103 T.C. at 360; see also 82 T.C. 804, 807, rev'd per curian and rem'd, 768 F.2d
1140, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9615 (9th Cir. 1985); Keller St. Dev. Co. v. Commissioner,
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was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's rejection of the primary purpose test
in Woodward v. Commissioner 9 Yet, its criticism fails to recognize that a court
applying the origin of the claim test must also determine if a profit-seeking activ-
ity exits.210
The absence of a profit-seeking activity automatically results in expendi-
tures being nondeductible personal expenses. However, if a profit-seeking activ-
ity exists, the origin of the claim test is applied to determine if the profit-seeking
activity was the source of the expenditure. In determining if a profit-seeking
activity exists, the court will apply a primary purpose test. This primary purpose
test, however, is not based on subjective intent as was the "primary purpose" test
which was used previously to characterize expenses and which was found inap-
propriate in Woodward v. Commissioner."' Rather, as Treasury Regulation
Section 1.183-2(a) states, the determination that the primary purpose of an activ-
ity is profit-seeking "is to be made by reference to objective standards, taking into
account all the facts and circumstances of the case".2 2
While applying the origin of the claim test requires that the chain of
events be examined, the first event in the chain may not represent the origin and
character of the transaction. This was evident when the Tax Court in Eisler v.
Commissioner found the origin of a transaction to be the more recently threatened
litigation rather than the lawsuit which was filed.23 The origin of the claim test
may not be applied mechanically.
When the origin of the claim test was initially stated by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Gilmore, characterization of a deductible expense
depended on whether or not the claim arose "in connection with" the taxpayer's
profit-seeking activities.24 An expense is incurred in connection with a transac-
tion if it is concurrent with that transaction .21 Likewise, one transaction may be
incurred in connection with a prior transaction216 Yet, within the chain of events,
dominant factors must determine the origin of the transaction, and expenses inci-
dental to that transaction must be characterized by its nature.2 17 A remote or insub-
37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1451, 1460 (1978), aff'd, 688 F.2d 675, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9601
(9th Cir. 1982).
209. Keller St. Dev., 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9601, at 85,188 (9th Cir. 1982).
210. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
212. Id.
213. 59 T.C. 634 (1973).
214. 372 U.S. 39, 48 (1963).
215. See Uffited States v. Kroy (Europe) Ltd., 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,316 (1994).
216. See Berry Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 584, 619 (1995).
217. See Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708, 713 (1973), acq. 1973-2 C.B. 1.
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stantial factor is not to be considered. Yet, the Eleventh Circuit states that using
a "proximate cause approach does not comport with Gilmore."2 ' Rather, the
examination in the origin of the claim is to be on the character of the claim and
its origin.
Whatever origin is suggested or selected, a relatively direct nexus
between it and the expenditure is needed."9 Using an analysis similar to the step
transaction doctrine might be helpful in determining the correct origin. Can the
separate steps of a transaction be viewed as interdependent parts of an overall
plan? If so, treat them as a single transaction."' The expenditure should be inter-
dependent with the stated origin. In other words, the expenditure would not have
occurred but for the origin listed. An alternative way of phrasing this test would
be: would a prudent business person have anticipated the realistic possibility of
the expenditure when he or she undertook the origin listed. If not, then the origin
is too far back in the chain of events to be used.
What, however, is the result if the litigation involving the defense or per-
fection of title is, itself, insubstantial? While a number of courts have held that
any litigation in defense or perfection of title is to be capitalized regardless of
whether or not the claim is frivolous, others have acknowledged the issue but
have not had to decide it to resolve the case before them. 2' Likewise, the sub-
stantiality of the property rights themselves which are being defended do not
appear to be a concern in determining the origin of the claim.m2
Dual Origins
In applying the origin of the claim test, "[t]he line of demarcation...is
often a shadowy one. ''2  Dual origins necessitates that ancillary costs which are
related to capital assets be distinguished from other costs which should be con-
sidered ordinary business expenses.24 This distinction can be close. Under the
218. United States v. Collins, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,365 at 85,263 (11th Cir. 1994), rev'g
and remanding, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,557 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (proximate cause was not an
appropriate test because the foreseeability of a benefit to the business creditor was not relevant for
determining the origin or character of the claim).
219. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
220. See Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 581 (1950), aff'd, 192 E2d 155, 51-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9482 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1950).
221. See Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19567, at 84,788
n.14 (1978).
222. Southland Royalty Co., 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9567, at 84,788 n.16 (1978).
223. Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708, 712 (1973), acq. 1973-2 C.B. 1.
224. See Honodel v. Commissioner, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9133, at 83,097 (9th Cir.
1984).
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origin of the claim test, an expenditure is characterized by the nature of the under-
lying claim. Depending on how an underlying claim is structured, it may be
viewed as a single transaction or two distinct transactions which provide dual ori-
gins. The case of Honodel v. Commissioner provides an example.225
In Honodel, FMS performed two general services for the taxpayer; i.e., an
advisory function and an acquisition function 26 For its advisory function, FMS
charged all clients a monthly retainer fee which was deductible under I.R.C.
Section 212.227 For its acquisition function, it charged an additional fee for each
project in which the client chose to invest.22 This fee was capitalized under I.R.C.
Section 263 as the expense originated in the process of the acquisition itself;
whereas, the retainer fee did not. 9 The Ninth Circuit found that the additional fee
for investment was an ancillary expense, similar to a brokerage fee, incurred to
acquire an asset m While the taxpayer attempted to deduct a portion of this addi-
tional fee as an ordinary and necessary expense paid for tax advice, the court con-
cluded that tax advice directly related to a capital acquisition or disposition is an
expense which must be capitalized.23'
The underlying events in Honodel supported a structure of two distinct
transactions. That distinction, however, cannot be created if the expenditures are
ancillary to the acquisition or defense of specific property. An argument for pro-
portional allocation of the expenditures based on each type of income recovered
cannot be supported. The proper focus must be the origin and character of the
claim for which the expenditures were incurred.232
Once the court has decided to characterize any part of an expenditure as
a deductible expense rather than a capitalized cost, an additional step is required
to allocate the expenditure. 33 Several methods of allocation have been accepted
by the courts.M When litigation resulted in an award which was in part taxable
and in part nontaxable, the legal expenses have been allocated based on a ratio of
nonexempt income to the total amount awarded. 35 But, if the litigation involves
different causes of action, legal fee arrangements and hourly billing records may
225. Id.
226. Id. at 83,096.
227. Id.
228. Honodel, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) T 9133, at 83,096.
229. Id. at 83,096-98.
230. Id. at 83,098.
231. Id. at 83,102.
232. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. McKay v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 465, 490 (1994).
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provide a precise amount of legal fees attributable to each action."6 Finally, with
regard to a settlement, the express language of the settlement agreement may be
used to allocate the payment.2 7 The courts, however, are not bound by the settle-
ment agreement if the parties did not engage in "bona fide, arm's length, adver-
sarial negotiations" or if the allocations are inconsistent with the true substance. 3'
Often, an allocation is not allowed because the taxpayer has failed to pro-
vide credible evidence upon which to base a reasonable allocation.2 9 Again,
because the distinction is close between ancillary costs related to capital assets
which are to be capitalized and other costs which are current operating expenses,
planning and documentation are critical factors. Regardless of the allocation
method applied, records are essential. The taxpayer has the burden of proof when
the Service disallows a deduction.
21
CONCLUSION
The tax benefits received from a taxpayer's expenditures depend on their
characterization as either currently deductible, nondeductible or capitalizable.
The origin of the claim test arose from a search for an objective test on which to
base this characterization. It represents a rejection of a test based on conse-
quences which would consider a taxpayer's motives or purposes in undertaking
the expenditure. Has it met these objectives?
The origin of the claim test cannot be applied without first identifying and
defining the originating activity. Defining the originating activity requires that
the taxpayer's motives or purposes be considered because they are relevant in
defining either a trade or business, an expense incurred in carrying on that trade
or business, or the true character of a transaction which may be disguised.
Identifying the originating activity becomes problematic as expenses become less
directly associated with litigation and as any clear distinction between transac-
tions becomes blurred. These issues intertwine with the origin of the claim test
adding uncertainty to its application.
236. Id. at 491.
237. Id. at 482.
238. Id. at 482; see McDonald v. Commissioner, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) 9631 (2nd Cir.
1978).
239. Honodel v. Commissioner, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9133, at 83,097 (9th Cir. 1984);
Kisska v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1651, 1654-55 (1981).
240. Kisska, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1655 (1981) (citing Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111
(1933) and Rule 142(a), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.)
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To create greater certainty in characterizing a taxpayer's expenditures, the
courts have looked to the form of the originating activity and to the appropriate-
ness of the test itself. If the originating activity is inherently personal, the expense
is personal. If the originating activity is to acquire or defend title to an asset, the
expense is capitalized. If a statute provides a specific test, it is applied to the
exclusion of the origin of the claim test.
The origin of the claim test is a facts and circumstances test. As the court
cases show, a facts and circumstances test will always provide room for differing
views.
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